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COMPETITIVE ADJUSTMENT AND RECOVERY: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
FOLLOWING THE DEPRECIATION OF STERLING
The author of this article is Teresa Sastre of the Associate Directorate General International Affairs.1
The experience of the United Kingdom following the depreciation of sterling illustrates how 
an adjustment in the nominal exchange rate can allow price competitiveness to recover 
rapidly and increase the surplus of the tradable sectors, potentially helping to limit the 
adverse effects of the recession. However, this process seems to have had a limited impact, 
since there has been no real improvement in productivity and unit costs to consolidate the 
competitiveness gains.
The competitiveness of an economy is a relative concept that measures the efficiency with 
which it allocates and uses its resources relative to other economies, with whose products 
it competes in foreign and domestic markets. An inefficient economy, with low productivity 
or higher production costs and margins than its competitors, will not be able to preserve 
its competitiveness and will suffer losses of market share both abroad and domestically, 
which will eventually affect its growth rate and level of welfare.
The competitiveness of an economy may be affected both by structural factors and by cyclical 
or temporary ones. From a structural viewpoint, the degree of incorporation of technological 
innovations into the productive process and the rate of accumulation of capital are fundamental 
determinants of productivity. Also, it is essential that price and wage formation mechanisms 
function well. In this regard, the existence of nominal rigidities limits the adjustment of relative 
prices to macroeconomic shocks and slows down the reallocation of productive factors, 
leading to losses of competitiveness and a build-up of imbalances.
Over the business cycle, higher inflation in periods of excess demand may lead to 
competitiveness losses, which will in principle be offset when activity falls below its 
potential level. However, during periods of recession, technological innovation and the 
level of human capital skills may suffer, leading to a more lasting deterioration in productive 
efficiency. The possible adverse effects of recessions will be all the greater the longer and 
deeper they are, which will in turn depend on the degree of flexibility present in the 
economy’s price formation mechanisms.
Structural policies, intended to remedy deficiencies in physical and human capital and to 
make price and wage adjustment mechanisms more flexible, are therefore the soundest 
way of improving competitive capacity. However, structural reforms take time to produce 
the desired effects. By contrast, depreciation of the exchange rate is a mechanism that can 
raise competitiveness rapidly. Exchange-rate flexibility is one of the economy’s cyclical 
adjustment mechanisms. Indeed, depreciation of the domestic currency may allow 
exporters to reduce the prices of their products abroad, and thus to recover market share: 
it may also enable prices in domestic currency to be raised to some extent, thereby 
generating funds to undertake job creation, investment or a reduction in the level of 
indebtedness in a situation of financial stress. In the case of imported products, their 
sterling prices will increase insofar as importers do not entirely absorb the impact of the 
depreciation. However, an exchange-rate adjustment will only be an appropriate mechanism 
to restore competitiveness if the decline has occurred as a result of non-structural factors.
Introduction
1  This article has had the benefit of excellent technical support from Roberto Pascual.
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The experience of the United Kingdom following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 illustrates 
this point. The depreciation of sterling at the beginning of the crisis entailed an improvement 
in the profitability of sectors producing tradable goods. This reduced job losses, boosted 
inflows of foreign direct investment and permitted deleveraging in some industries. 
However, with the passage of time no real improvement in productivity has been observed 
to support a lasting recovery in competitiveness.
This article, in the next two sections, reviews and analyses the impact that the sharp 
depreciation (of around 30%) in the pound sterling had on the price competitiveness of British 
exports and on margins in the tradable goods sector. It then goes on to examine whether the 
improvement in the unit margin helped to smooth the adjustment in employment and 
investment, and to what extent it relieved the financial situation of firms at a time of severe 
difficulty to access external financing. The final section summarises the main conclusions that 
may be drawn from this experience of competitiveness adjustment through depreciation.
At the start of the global financial crisis the pound depreciated sharply. The nominal 
effective exchange rate fell by almost 30% between 2007 and 2009 (see Chart 1.1). 
However, the depreciation had little effect on the reallocation of resources towards the 
production of tradable goods and services. The reduction in the trade deficit in the 
immediately following quarters was largely due to the fall in imports arising from the impact 
of the crisis on domestic demand, although the rise in the relative prices of imported 
products caused by the depreciation also contributed to this process. At the same time, 
despite its magnitude, the effect of the depreciation on exports was relatively weak.
There are several reasons that may explain the limited impact of the depreciation on 
exports. First, the importance of exports of financial services in the United Kingdom 
(around 12% of total exports) should be mentioned. The financial nature of the crisis and 
the consequent fall in financial activity at the global level severely affected this sector in the 
United Kingdom, which recovered more slowly and modestly than other tradable sectors. 
This relative slowness is reflected in the growth differential between exports of goods and 
services following the depreciation (see Chart 2.1) and helps to explain why services 
exports performed worse than projected by econometric models, while goods exports 
were more in line with the behaviour derived from their determinants2. As a result, the 
upward trend displayed by the United Kingdom’s share of services trade prior to the crisis 
came to a halt in 2008 and subsequently went into reverse.3 On the whole, the growth of 
British exports was lower than the growth of their markets (see Chart 2.2)
Second, the fact that only a small proportion of British exports are to dynamic markets 
should be noted. In particular, the EU countries, whose growth was especially hit by the 
crisis, are among the United Kingdom’s main trading partners. Finally, the depreciation of 
the pound was not fully passed through to export prices, which only declined by 15% 
between 2007 and 2010 (see Chart 1.2), limiting the improvement in price competitiveness.
There are a number of reasons why a depreciation may not be fully passed through to 
export prices. One possibility is that the competitive advantage offered by the depreciation 
may be used by local producers to increase the price of their products and restore their 
mark-ups. The mark-ups of British producers had narrowed at the start of the crisis due to 
the rise in labour costs and the higher prices of imported inputs due to the depreciation 
Impact of the depreciation 
of sterling on trade flows
2  See López Vicente (2012).
3  See Kamath and Paul (2011), Chart 5.
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itself. When a significant proportion of exporters follow pricing-to-market strategies, 
setting different prices according to conditions in the target market, or when they set 
export prices in foreign currency (foreign currency invoicing), the price in local currency of 
sales abroad will be the result of the strategy of pricing in foreign currency in each target 
market and of exchange-rate movements. Had British producers decided to keep the 
price of their products in foreign currency unchanged, the depreciation of 2008-2009 
would have entailed an average increase in the price in pounds of exports of around 30%, 
with the consequent increase in the unit margin, but their price competitiveness would not 
have improved. As the sterling prices of sales abroad increased by around 15% between 
2007 and 2010 it may be inferred that exporters reduced their prices in foreign markets by 
less than the depreciation, thereby increasing their mark-ups, or offsetting higher costs.
This behaviour was not specific to this crisis. The evidence available shows that around 
70% of British exporters set the price of their products in foreign currency,4 especially in 
the case of sales to other EU countries, since the euro is a currency with large and liquid 
markets, so that the cost of hedging is lower than in other cases.5 The evidence also 
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4  Goldberg and Tille (2009).
5  See MacCoille et al. (2009).
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indicates that British manufacturers tend to align the prices of their products more with 
those of their competitors, when expressed in a common currency, than with their own 
labour costs,6 in an attempt to conserve market share. In any case, the depreciation of the 
exchange rate offers goods and services exporters the possibility of choosing between 
various combinations of improvement of price competitiveness and increase in their mark-
ups. Whatever the reason for the increase in export prices, the depreciation of the pound 
offered exporters of goods and services the opportunity to increase the sterling unit margin 
and to improve the profitability of the export sector, a possibility that was not available to 
the producers of non-tradable goods. The change in the relative profitability of the tradable 
and non-tradable sectors is precisely one of the mechanisms that can bring about a 
reallocation of resources within the economy.
The depreciation of the pound also led to a rise in the price of imports relative to domestic 
output. The sterling price of imported products rose by 15% in a year (implying a degree 
of pass-through of close to 60%, in line with the average estimated by the Bank of England7 
for this period) (see Chart 3.1). Subsequently, the strengthening of domestic demand in 
2010 enabled import prices to rise further, almost completing full pass-through of the 
depreciation.
Overall, import prices increased by 17% relative to the GDP deflator. This helped, to 
some extent, to check import penetration in the domestic market (see Chart 3.2), which 
had been rising continuously over the previous decade, as a consequence of the higher 
degree of global integration of economies and the notable appreciation of the pound in 
1996 and 1997. The stabilisation from 2007 of the import content of final demand is 
nevertheless attributed, above all, to the fall in demand that the crisis entailed. It should 
be pointed out that the increases in prices were particularly significant in the case of 
services imports,8 whose price rose more rapidly than that of goods imports between 
2007 and 2011.9 An example of this is the speed at which exchange rate changes were 
passed through to the price of tourist travel abroad, which led to a shift of demand 
towards domestic tourism. 
6  See Buisán et al. (2006).
7  See Bank of England (2015).
8  See Kamath and Paul (2011).
9  During the subsequent appreciation of the pound, the price of services imports fell more slowly than that of 
goods imports.
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The behaviour of trade margins in the productive sectors of the British economy may be 
approximated by the growth differential between the value added deflator of each sector 
and its unit labour costs. This differential provides information on the changes in the 
surplus per unit of output or unit margin.
Despite experiencing stagnation at the beginning of the global crisis, margins rose by 
3.5% in the British economy as a whole from 2007 to 2013, because prices grew (14%) 
by more than unit labour costs (see Table 1). This widening was more marked in the 
tradable goods sector, particularly at the onset of the crisis. Thus, between 2007 and 
2013 the surplus per unit of output in manufacturing sectors and in financial services 
(which can be considered tradable in the case of the British economy, due to the 
importance of international transactions in the financial system as a whole) grew by 18% 
and 14.5%, respectively. Conversely, in the case of sectors whose main market is the 
domestic one, margins either narrowed slightly, as in the case of distribution, transport 
and the restaurant industry, or more sharply, as in business services and leisure and 
cultural activities.   
As noted above, the widening of margins was not a consequence of a decline in unit labour 
costs, but rather of a notable increase in prices, exceeding that of costs. Costs increased, 
even in the early years of the crisis, in almost all sectors, due to the weak growth of labour 
productivity (see Chart 4). However, in a context of depreciation of the British currency, 
firms producing tradable goods and services (manufacturing and financial services)10 were 
able to pass through this rise in costs to the prices of their products in pounds, causing 
real wages to fall in these sectors and cheapening the labour factor.   
The fall in real wages was substantially widespread among productive activities, in line 
with the weak growth of productivity. The low investment rates of the British economy 
since the start of the century seem to have reduced the capital-labour ratio, in terms of 
both physical and technological capital. At the same time, as regards human capital, there 
has been a loss of skills, due to the crisis, and a mismatch between the level of education 
Improvement of margins 
in the tradable goods 
sector
VA deflator ULC Unit margin VA deflator ULC Unit margin
9.38.17.53.0-4.81.8ymonoce latoT
3.97.210.227.22.79.9yrtsudnI
2.212.54.716.52.49.9gnirutcafunaM    
2.48.80.314.21-0.73.5-noitcurtsnoC
4.36.0-8.26.05.81.9secivreS
    Distribution, transport, hotels and restaurants 13.0 13.3 -0.4 3.2 3.6 -0.3
0.1-8.38.26.20.5-4.2-noitacinummoc dna noitamrofnI    
8.114.4-4.77.20.17.3ecnarusni dna secivres laicnaniF    
1.32.013.315.811.6-4.21seitivitca etatse laeR    
    Professional, technical and administrative activities 7.5 9.8 -2.3 -5.8 -5.0 -0.8
    Public administration, education and health care 8.9 9.9 -1.0 -1.8 -2.1 0.4
    Artistic, leisure and cultural activities 17.7 28.0 -10.3 6.7 4.9 1.7
Cumulative change (2007-2010) (%) Cumulative change (2010-2013) (%)
PRICES, COSTS AND MARGINS BY INDUSTRY TABLE 1
SOURCE: Eurostat.
10  Financial services experienced a fall in labour costs from 2010 that led to wider margins.
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of young people joining the labour market and the demand for skilled labour.11 All of this 
has caused a decline in total factor productivity in broad areas of the economy12 and 
insufficient capital endowment,13 with consequences for the growth of labour productivity 
(see Chart 4.2). 
In a context of lower activity, modest recovery of demand and, especially, restricted access 
to external financing, those firms that were able to generate funds by widening their margin 
per unit of output found themselves in a better position to temper the impact of the crisis 
on their investment plans and demand for labour. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to 
expect employment and investment developments to have been more favourable in export 
sectors than in other sectors.
From the start of the crisis, employment in the United Kingdom went through two clearly 
distinct phases. With few exceptions, employment decreased across the various sectors 
of activity more or less sharply up to 2010, the adjustment being more marked in terms of 
hours worked, in line with other advanced economies.14 Construction and industry were 
the sectors where a greater relative decrease was recorded (see Chart 5.1). The British 
labour market embarked on a process of recovery in 2011, with employment increasing by 
4.2% in the economy as a whole, driven by job creation in services, while employment in 
the industrial sector barely increased.  Nonetheless, the behaviour of the industrial sector 
from 2009 was quite favourable when compared with the previous period (2000-2009), 
which was marked by a structural decline in employment that reduced the number of 
hours worked by 30%.
If we examine the changes in employment and margins during the crisis in different 
industries, we see that these variables are almost completely unrelated. However, there is 
a positive relationship in each industry between the margins and the change in employment, 
when the latter is measured relative to its path in the period prior to the crisis15 (see 
Chart 5.2). Those sectors with the sharpest adjustments in employment between 2007 and 
2010, relative to the patterns prevailing in them between 2000 and 2007 (professional and 
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11  See OECD (2015).
12  See IMF (2016).
13  See Barnett et al. (2014).
14  See Faccini and Hackworth (2010) and Cuadro-Sáez et al. (2012).
15  Measured as the deviation of the annual average change in the periods 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 from the 
average in the period 2000-2007.
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business services and construction), were among those recording the most pronounced 
falls in margins. Likewise, between 2010 and 2013, those posting the largest relative 
recoveries in employment (manufacturing industries) were also those which showed the 
largest improvements in margins since the start of the crisis.
In the case of investment decisions a positive relationship is also detected over the period 
2007-2010 between the changes in margins in the various industries and the changes in 
gross fixed capital formation, relative to the pre-crisis period, although the correlation is 
lower than in the case of employment. It appears, therefore, that those sectors that 
recorded an improvement in their margins (in particular, tradable sectors, which benefited 
from the depreciation) were able to mitigate the adjustment in employment and investment 
during the recessionary stage of the crisis to a greater extent than non-tradable sectors. 
During the recovery, this improvement was conducive to a more favourable trend in 
employment relative to the average level of the pre-crisis period.
In general, the behaviour of employment during the crisis was more favourable than that 
of investment, the weakness of which has been attributed to various factors (the fall in 
activity and the sluggish recovery, difficulties in obtaining bank financing, uncertainty and 
vulnerability due to high indebtedness). These factors must also have had an adverse 
effect on the demand for labour, but there were other factors that smoothed the fall in 
employment and boosted its subsequent increase, including the change in the relative 
price of labour and capital. In manufacturing and financial services, as mentioned above, 
real wages in terms of producer prices fell notably, as they also did more widely. The 
change in the relative price of these factors of production, characterised by a larger fall in 
real wages than in the user cost of capital,16 helps to explain the more favourable behaviour 
of employment relative to investment observed in the United Kingdom.
The improvement in margins in manufacturing increased the profitability of the sector and 
narrowed the differential with the return on foreign investment, which had been favourable 
to the latter during the pre-crisis period. In conjunction with the fall in the profitability of 
foreign investment from 2011, very probably due to the euro area crisis, this helped to 
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make investment in British manufacturing more attractive. As a result, a certain shift was 
observed in the pattern of investment decisions in this industry at the global level in favour 
of the United Kingdom, as reflected in the net increase in foreign liabilities in the form of 
direct investment (see Chart 6.1), which contrasts with the accumulation of net foreign 
assets in the period 2000-2007, when the profitability of investment in the United Kingdom 
was significantly lower than the return on foreign direct investment. The geographical shift 
in investment has been somewhat more general, since the direct investment position of 
the United Kingdom, traditionally in credit, has become a net debit one, since 2011.17 The 
increase in the foreign liabilities of the manufacturing and financial services industries, 
those with the largest increases in margins during the crisis and the subsequent recovery, 
has been particularly important in this process.18
The growth of business investment in the United Kingdom, from 2010, following its decline 
prior to the start of the crisis, was insufficient to absorb the notable increase in business 
saving stemming from the increase in margins, so that the net lending of non-financial 
corporations increased from 2% of GDP in 2007 to 4.4% in 2011. Against a background 
of growing risk aversion and difficulties in obtaining bank and financial market financing, 
some of the corporate savings were likely used to reduce firms’ high levels of indebtedness.
There is no breakdown for corporate indebtedness by industry, but the data on bank 
lending, which are available with such a breakdown, indicate that those sectors that 
recorded the largest increases in margins were also those that reduced their bank 
borrowing most, at least during the early years of the crisis (See Chart 6.2). That said, it is 
difficult to infer from this relationship a pattern for the indebtedness of each industry, given 
the complexity of sources of financing available to firms resident in the United Kingdom: 
debt securities, financing from abroad through companies belonging to the same group, 
as well as from foreign banks, for which barely any information is available by industry. 
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Since the start of the crisis, all these sources have contributed to the deleveraging that has 
taken place in the corporate sector, its debt-to-GDP ratio having fallen notably, from 96% 
in 2008 to 73% in 2014.
The experience of the United Kingdom during the Great Recession shows that the 
depreciation of the pound led to an immediate, but transitory, recovery in price 
competitiveness, reflected in an improvement in net exports. The pass-through of the 
depreciation to foreign-currency export prices was not complete, so that part of the 
increase in foreign market share was sacrificed in exchange for an increase in profitability 
in the tradable sectors. The improvement in the profitability of these producers allowed job 
losses to be softened, higher levels of foreign direct investment attracted and leverage 
reduced. This was of great importance, since it limited the adverse effects of the crisis on 
potential growth and helped reduce firms’ financial vulnerability. However, no substantial 
gains in productivity – notably weak since the start of the crisis – were achieved. This has 
been reflected in rising unit labour costs, despite wage moderation, so that producer 
prices have increased further in the UK than in its trading partners, leading to a progressive 
loss of price competitiveness, as the favourable effects of the depreciation have faded. In 
short, there has been no real improvement in productivity to sustain a permanent gain in 
competitiveness.
In the United Kingdom, the loss of competitiveness has not arisen so much from a lack of 
labour market or product market flexibility as from very modest productivity growth (as a 
result of a low rate of capital accumulation and mismatches in the supply and demand for 
labour). The deterioration of productive, technological and human capital and the lack of 
effective policies to address these challenges remain an obstacle to improvements in the 
efficiency and competitiveness of this economy.
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